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2014-06-06    来源:网络    【      美国外教 在线口语培训

Finance and Economics;财经;

Man and machine;投资人与经济机器;

The economic ideas of the world's most successful hedge-fund boss;

“The most beautiful deleveraging yet seen” is how Ray Dalio describes what is now going on in America's economy. As America has gone through the necessary process of reducing its debt-to-income ratio since the financial crash of 2008, he reckons its policymakers have done well in mixing painful stuff like debt restructuring with injections of cash to keep demand growing. Europe's deleveraging, by contrast, is “ugly”.
“这是我所见过的最美丽的去杠杆化”Ray Daio如此描述美国的经济现状。2008年经济危机以来,美国经历了为降低负债收入比而必须的的过程,他认为美国的政策制定者们在均衡棘手事务如债务重调和资金注入从而保持需求的持续上升方面做得可圈可点。相比之下,欧洲的去杠杆化显得“丑陋不堪”。

Mr Dalio's views are taken seriously. He made a fortune betting before the crash that the world had taken on too much debt and would need to slash it. Last year alone, his Bridgewater Pure Alpha fund earned its investors 13.8 billion Dollor, taking its total gains since it opened in 1975 to 35.8 billion Dollor, more than any other hedge fund ever, including the previous record-holder, George Soros's Quantum Endowment Fund.
Dalio的观点备受界内关注。在经济危机产生之前,他曾对经济局势做了一个断言,即世界经济需要大幅度地削减过重的负债。只去年一年,他的Bridgewater Pure Alpha基金就给投资者带来了138亿美元的回报,这也使得该基金达到自开创以来的358亿美元,并超过了包括以前的纪录保持者George Soros的 Quantum Endownment基金在内的任何一项对冲基金。

Mr Dalio, an intense 62-year-old, is following in the footsteps of Mr Soros in other ways, too. Mr Soros has published several books on his theories, and is funding an institute to get mainstream economists to take alternative ideas seriously. Mr Dalio, too, is now trying to improve the public understanding of how the economy works. His economic model “is not very orthodox but gives him a pretty good sense of where the economy is,” says Paul Volcker, a former chairman of America's Federal Reserve and one of Mr Dalio's growing number of influential fans.
在其他方面,现如今富有激情的已62岁的Dalio也在紧跟Soros的步伐。Soros至今已经出版了多本有关其理论的书籍,并正在资助一个机构,以便促使主流经济学家对另类思想加以重视。Dalio也在努力促进公众对经济运作过程的理解。美联储前主席Paul Volcker,作为Dalio日益增多且颇具影响力的粉丝之一,称其经济模式“并非绝对正统,但带给了他相当敏感的经济趋势把握能力”。

Whereas Mr Soros credits the influence of Karl Popper, a philosopher who taught him as a student, Mr Dalio says his ideas are entirely the product of his own reflections on his life as a trader and his study of economic history. He has read little academic economics (though his work has echoes of Hyman Minsky, an American economist, and of best-selling recent work on downturns by Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff) but has conducted in-depth analysis of past periods of economic upheaval, such as the Depression in America, post-war Britain and the hyperinflation of the Weimar Republic. He has even simulated being an investor in markets in those periods by reading daily papers from these eras, receiving data and “trading” as if in real time.
不同的是,Soros把他的成功归于其学生时代的哲学家老师Karl Popper的影响。Dalio则说他的思想完全是自己作为一个交易商的生活感悟和对经济学历史研究的产物。他几乎没有读过正统的学术经济学(虽然他的著作得到了美国经济学家Hyman Minsky以及Carmen Reinhart和Kenneth Rogoff最近有关经济低迷的畅销书的回应),但是他对过去的经济剧变时期的情况作了深入分析,其中包括美国的经济大萧条,战后的英国和魏玛共和国的恶性通货膨胀。他甚至曾假装自己是当时的投资者,通过阅读当时的日报来获得数据信息,并进行现实般的“交易”。

In the early 1980s Mr Dalio started writing down rules that would guide his investing. He would later amend these rules depending on how well they predicted what actually happened. The process is now computerised, so that combinations of scores of decision-rules are applied to the 100 or so liquid-asset classes in which Bridgewater invests. These rules led him to hold both government bonds and gold last year, for example, because the deleveraging process was at a point where, unusually, those two assets would rise at the same time. He was right.

What Mr Dalio calls the “timeless and universal” core of his economic ideas is set out in a 20-page “Template for Understanding” that he wrote shortly after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008 and recently updated. The document begins: “The economy is like a machine.” This machine may look complex but is, he insists, relatively simple even if it is “not well understood”. Mr Dalio models the macroeconomy from the bottom up, by focusing on the individual transactions that are the machine's moving parts. Conventional economics does not pay enough attention to the individual components of supply and, above all, demand, he says. To understand demand properly, you must know whether it is funded by the buyers' own money or by credit from others.
Dalio所谓的“不受时间限制,放之四海而皆准”的经济思想核心陈述于20页的《用于理解的模板》中。他写于2008年雷曼兄弟(Lehman Brothers)破产后不久并于近日更新。该文件以“经济就像一台机器”开始,他坚信,这台机器可能看起来复杂,但实际上它是相对简单的,即使是在它“不被很好地理解”的情况下。Dalio通过对经济机器的移动组成部分——个体交易,来自下而上地模拟宏观经济。他说,传统经济学对个体组成的供应尤其是他们的需求关注不够。要恰当地了解需求,你就必须知道为它提供资金的钱是来自购买者自己还是从他人的借贷。

A huge amount of Bridgewater's efforts goes into gathering data on credit and equity, and understanding how that affects demand from individual market participants, such as a bank, or from a group of participants (such as subprime-mortgage borrowers). Bridgewater predicted the euro-zone debt crisis by totting up how much debt would need to be refinanced and when; and by examining all the potential buyers of that debt and their ability to buy it. Mr Volcker describes the degree of detail in Mr Dalio's work as “mind-blowing” and admits to feeling sometimes that “he has a bigger staff, and produces more relevant statistics and analyses, than the Federal Reserve.”

Two sorts of credit cycle are at the heart of Mr Dalio's economic model: the business cycle, which typically lasts five to eight years, and a long-term (“long wave”) debt cycle, which can last 50-70 years. A business cycle usually ends in a recession, because the central bank raises the interest rate, reducing borrowing and demand. The debt cycle ends in deleveraging because there is a “shortage of capable providers of capital and/or a shortage of capable recipients of capital( borrowers and sellers of equity) that cannot be rectified by the central bank changing the cost of money.” Business cycles happen often, they are well understood and policymakers are fairly adept at managing them. A debt cycle tends to come along in a country once in a lifetime, tends to be poorly understood and is often mishandled by policymakers.

An ordinary recession can be ended by the central bank lowering the interest rate again. A deleveraging is much harder to end. According to Mr Dalio, it usually requires some combination of debt restructurings and write-offs, austerity, wealth transfers from rich to poor and money-printing. A “beautiful deleveraging” is one in which all these elements combine to keep the economy growing at a nominal rate that is higher than the nominal interest rate. (Beauty is in the eye of the beholder: Mr Dalio expects America's GDP growth to average only 2% over a 15-year period.)

Print too little money and the result is an ugly, deflationary deleveraging (see Greece); print too much and the deleveraging may become inflationary, as in Weimar Germany. Although Mr Dalio says he fears being misunderstood as saying “print a lot of money and everything will be OK, which I don't believe, all deleveragings have ended with the printing of significant amounts of money. But it has to be in balance with other policies.”

Mr Dalio admits to being wrong roughly a third of the time; indeed, he attributes a big part of his success to managing the risk of bad calls. And the years ahead are likely to provide a serious test of whether the economic machine is as simple as he says. For now, he is in a more optimistic mood thanks to the European Central Bank's recent moves, in effect, to print money. Although he still expects debt restructuring in Spain, Portugal, Italy and Ireland, on top of that in Greece, he says that the “risk of chaos has been reduced and we are now calming ourselves down.”Here's hoping he is right again.

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